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Abstract 
The paper explores the determinants of, and the relationship between ethnic 
culture retention and host society culture adoption among Turkish immigrants in 
Germany, France, and the Netherlands, using original survey data. To maximize 
cross-national comparability, we focus on immigrants from two Turkish regions 
who themselves or whose parents migrated before 1975. As indicators of ethnic 
retention we investigate Turkish and Muslim identification, Turkish language 
proficiency and observance of Islamic religious practices. Host culture adoption is 
measured by host country identification, host country language proficiency and 
use, and interethnic social contacts. We formulate hypotheses regarding cross-
national differences based on how integration policy approaches affect the 
material benefits and emotional costs of retention and adoption. We find that 
ethnic retention is strongest in the Netherlands, where multicultural policies were 
long prevalent, while host culture adoption is strongest in the French context, 
which has more strongly emphasised assimilation, at least where participation in 
the public realm is concerned. We further show that on the individual level, there 
is a negative relationship between ethnic retention and host culture adoption, 
which persists after controlling for relevant background variables. 
 Zusammenfassung 
Das Paper untersucht anhand von Umfragedaten, inwieweit türkische Migranten 
in Deutschland, Frankreich und den Niederlanden die Kultur ihres Herkunfts-
landes bewahren und wie stark sie die Kultur ihres Wohnlandes annehmen, 
welche Determinanten diese Prozesse bestimmen und wie sie miteinander 
zusammenhängen. Um eine größtmögliche Vergleichbarkeit der Länder zu errei-
chen, konzentriert sich die Analyse auf Migranten aus zwei türkischen Provinzen, 
die selbst oder deren Eltern vor 1975 zugewandert sind. Als Indikatoren für die 
Bewahrung der Herkunftslandkultur werden türkische und muslimische Identifika-
tion, türkische Sprachkenntnisse und das Befolgen islamischer religiöser Vor-
schriften herangezogen. Anhand von Wohnlandidentifikation, der Beherrschung 
und des Gebrauchs der Sprache des Wohnlandes sowie der interethnischen 
Kontakte wird gemessen, inwieweit die Kultur des Wohnlandes angenommen 
wird. Die von uns aufgestellten Hypothesen zu Unterschieden zwischen den 
Ländern gehen von der Annahme aus, dass der materielle Nutzen und die emo-
tionalen Kosten, die mit einer Bewahrung der Kultur des Herkunftslandes oder 
einer Orientierung auf die des Wohnlandes einhergehen, je nach integrations-
politischem Ansatz verschieden ausfallen. Unsere Befunde zeigen, dass die 
Bewahrung der Kultur des Herkunftslandes am deutlichsten in den Niederlanden 
ausgeprägt ist, wo lange Jahre eine Politik des Multikulturalismus verfolgt wurde. 
Die Übernahme der Kultur des Wohnlandes hingegen ist am deutlichsten in 
Frankreich, einem stärkeren Verfechter der Assimilation zumindest im öffent-
lichen Bereich, zu beobachten. Aus den Ergebnissen geht des Weiteren hervor, 
dass es zwischen der Bewahrung der Herkunftslandkultur und der Annahme der 
Wohnlandkultur einen negativen Zusammenhang gibt, der auch unter Kontrolle 
relevanter Drittvariablen bestehen bleibt.  
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Introduction 
One of the core challenges raised by increased global interactions and 
interdependencies is the increased cultural diversity resulting from long-distance 
migration flows. This challenge has been felt in a particularly pronounced way in 
European immigration countries, which – compared to the immigration countries 
of the New World – were until recently relatively culturally homogenous, and 
traditionally had ethno-culturally relatively "thick" conceptions of nationhood. 
While during the 1980s and 1990s several European countries experimented to 
varying degrees with multicultural approaches to immigrant's socio-cultural 
integration, more recently a "return to assimilation" has been observed in several 
countries (e.g., Brubaker 2001). This development is reflected in the legislation 
that several European countries introduced obliging immigrants to take 
citizenship and language courses (see Costa-Lascoux 2006; Joppke 2007). 
These policy innovations indicate a growing concern with socio-cultural aspects 
of immigrant integration such as language skills, interethnic relations, 
identification with the host society, and the role of religion, in particular Islam. 
These cultural aspects of integration are viewed both as important in their own 
right, and as conditions for successful socio-economic integration.  
Though at the moment there seems to be some convergence, European 
countries have historically followed different approaches to cope with increased 
cultural diversity (see e.g., Brubaker 1992; Joppke 1999; Favell 2001). Our aim in 
this paper is to investigate to what extent these different approaches are related 
to different outcomes regarding immigrants’ retention of ethnic culture, on the one 
hand, and the adoption of elements of the host country culture, on the other. This 
requires a cross-national comparative perspective. Although cross-national 
studies of immigrant integration have recently become more frequent, most focus 
on socio-economic aspects such as labor market participation and income (e.g. 
Kogan 2007; Morissens and Sainsbury 2005; Euwals et al. 2007; Muus 2003; 
van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004). Cross-national studies of socio-cultural 
aspects of integration are few and far between, with some exceptions regarding 
language acquisition (Chiswick and Miller 1995; van Tubergen and Kalmijn 
2005), religious affiliation and attendance (van Tubergen 2005), and identification 
and social contacts (Berry et al. 2006; Dagevos et al. 2006).  
Whether they focus on socio-economic or on socio-cultural integration, previous 
comparative studies of immigrant integration faced important problems of cross-
national comparability (Favell 2003), which we will elaborate in more detail in the 
research design section below. We circumvent such problems by focusing on 
one clearly circumscribed immigrant group, namely immigrants from selected 
parts of rural Turkey who arrived in the countries of destination before 1975, as 
well as the descendants of these immigrants. The evidence we draw on derives 
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from cross-national survey data that were specifically collected for this study. On 
the destination country side, we focus on Germany, France, and the Netherlands, 
where more than 70 percent of all people of Turkish origin in the European Union 
live. These countries have followed distinct approaches to immigrant integration 
over the past decades, and therefore differ significantly on our independent 
variable of theoretical interest. We investigate four aspects of socio-cultural 
integration: identification, language use and proficiency, interethnic social 
contacts, and religious observance. These are common and significant indicators 
of ethnic culture retention and host country culture adoption (see e.g., Berry et al. 
2006; Dagevos 2001; Gans 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). We treat Islamic 
religiosity as part of ethnic culture retention since Islam is the dominant religion in 
Turkey but not in any of the host countries. 
In what follows, we clarify how we theoretically conceptualize our dependent – 
ethnic culture retention and host country culture adoption – and core independent 
– immigrant integration regimes – variables. We then introduce our research 
design, specify hypotheses about the relation between integration policies and 
adoption and retention, and present the results of multivariate regression 
analyses. Of course we do not assume that immigrant integration regimes are the 
single or even the most important factor determining host country adoption and 
ethnic retention. We therefore control for a range of additional variables that 
might affect our dependent variables, including regional origin, socio-economic 
status, gender and the relative size and within-country distribution of the Turkish 
immigrant population. Although we also find important cross-national 
commonalities, we conclude that after controlling for all these additional factors, 
significant cross-national differences remain regarding most aspects of ethnic 
retention and host-culture adoption. 
Socio-cultural integration and immigrant integration 
regimes 
Socio-cultural integration of immigrants has long been discussed under the 
heading of "assimilation." Early studies of immigrant integration in the US 
presented assimilation as a linear and inevitable process and have been 
challenged by various scholars (see Alba and Nee 2003). The main criticisms 
were that immigrant integration into the host society consists of several 
dimensions, that adopting the host culture is not the same as abandoning the 
ethnic culture, and that there is no singular core culture that immigrants can 
blend into (Gans 1997; Alba and Nee 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). 
The different combinations that host-culture and ethnic-culture orientations can 
take have been conceptualized in a succinct way by Berry (1997). His model 
distinguishes two dimensions of what he calls “acculturation.” The first is whether 
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immigrants maintain their culture of origin (ethnic culture); the second whether 
they adopt the national, i.e. host country, culture. The combination of these two 
dimensions leads to four acculturation strategies: integration, in which both 
cultures are combined, assimilation in which the national culture is adopted at the 
expense of the ethnic culture, segregation, when the ethnic culture is maintained 
without adoption of the national culture, and marginalization, when the immigrant 
is distant from both cultures. 
Immigrants’ opportunities to pursue various acculturation strategies are shaped 
by the societies in which they live (Gans 1997; Berry 2001). Several typologies 
on how nation states respond to immigrants can be found in the literature (e.g. 
Castles 1995; Rex 1997; Soysal 1994; Berry 2001; Entzinger 2000). These 
typologies usually distinguish the degree of openness to individual immigrants on 
the one hand, and the accommodation of cultural group differences on the other. 
Koopmans et al. (2005; see also Koopmans and Statham 2000) label these two 
dimensions as ethnic-civic and monist-pluralist. The ethnic-civic dimension 
concerns the degree to which immigrants are seen as members of the nation and 
receive the same individual rights as the host population. The monism-pluralism 
dimension concerns the degree to which receiving societies accommodate the 
cultural identity of immigrants, by supporting ethnic or religious group formation 
or by granting special rights or exempting cultural groups from certain obligations.  
Almost all studies classify Germany, France, and the Netherlands as being closer 
to one of three different ideal-types, which are respectively characterized by 
difficult access for immigrants to individual citizenship rights and little 
accommodation of cultural difference (Germany), easy access to individual 
equality but little accommodation of cultural difference (France), and easy access 
to individual rights combined with a relatively high degree of accommodation of 
cultural difference (the Netherlands). We follow Koopmans et al. (2005) in 
labelling these integration regime types as respectively “assimilationism,” 
“universalism,” and “multiculturalism.” It should be clear from the above that the 
use of the label “universalism” to denote French-style integration policies does 
not imply the absence of assimilation pressures. In universalist regimes, overt 
expressions of ethnic, linguistic or religious identity are seen as conflicting with 
participation in public institutions, as demonstrated in an exemplary fashion by 
the French ban on the wearing of “ostentatious religious symbols” in public 
schools. Contrary to assimilationist regimes, however, the public culture is not 
defined in particularistic terms (as in the frequent references in German debates 
to the country’s “Judeo-Christian” identity) but is – at least in theory – culturally 
neutral, i.e. universal. 
Of course, these are ideal-types, and no country fully fits any single one of them 
across all domains of integration. Moreover, immigrant integration policies are not 
set in stone and have changed over the years. Further, it is important to keep in 
mind that the position of immigrants is not only influenced by integration policies 
but also by pre-existing institutional settings such as the relation between the 
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state and religious cults and the degree of room for pluralism. Often integration 
policies are an extension of these regulations (see e.g. Soysal 1994; Favell 2001; 
Entzinger 2005). 
Against typologies of integration regimes, some authors have argued that 
integration policies are influenced by pressures for international convergence 
rather than by national ideologies (e.g., Freeman 2004; Weil 2001; Joppke 2007). 
Koopmans et al. (2005) have empirically investigated policy changes in five 
European countries (the three that are investigated in this paper plus the United 
Kingdom and Switzerland) over two decades (1980-2002) on the basis of 24 
indicators. They found a trend in all countries towards more pluralist and civic 
policies, but differences between countries remained substantial and of about the 
same magnitude. Germany, France, and the Netherlands occupied distinct 
positions at each of the three time points they investigated (1980, 1990, and 
2002). Evidence for 2006 gathered by the Migration Policy Group and the British 
Council summarized into the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)1 shows 
that in spite of post-9/11 changes in integration policies in many countries, Dutch 
policies still grant immigrants easier access to rights than German and French 
policies. The MIPEX index encompasses over 140 indicators regarding access to 
nationality, family reunion, long-term residence, labour market access, anti-
discrimination, and political participation. Across 27 European countries plus 
Canada, the Netherlands rank 4th, France 11th, and Germany 14th. The MIPEX 
indicators do not systematically distinguish between individual citizenship rights 
and accommodation of cultural difference, but in line with Koopmans et al.'s 
(2005) findings, they show that Germany scores particularly low on access to 
nationality and anti-discrimination (where France and the Netherlands are very 
close together), whereas France scores lowest among the three countries (and 
the Netherlands highest) on the indicator cluster that most clearly taps group 
rights, namely political participation, which includes special consultative bodies 
for immigrants and subsidies for their organizations. 
We view immigrant integration regimes as opportunity structures that raise or 
lower the material as well as emotional costs and benefits attached to cultural 
retention and adoption. Integration regimes affect material costs and benefits by 
specifying to what extent adoption of the host culture or retention of the ethnic 
culture affect 1) access to rights (e.g., those tied to citizenship); 2) claims to 
institutional resources (e.g., state funding and access to decision making); and 3) 
opportunities for participation in various sectors of public life (e.g. in schools). We 
give some examples of how the integration policy regimes prevalent in Germany, 
France, and the Netherlands affect these three types of material costs and 
benefits. 
First, the ease or difficulty with which immigrants can become citizens is an 
important determinant of access to rights, which include not only the right to vote 
                                                     
 1 See http://www.integrationindex.eu/, accessed 29 October 2008. 
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and stand for office, but also access to certain welfare benefits, employment as a 
civil servant, full protection against expulsion, and freedom from visa obligations 
when travelling abroad. All three countries demand linguistic and cultural 
assimilation of applicants for naturalization but to varying extents. Before 2003, 
the Netherlands was least demanding. Between 1983 and 2003, less than two 
per cent of applications were turned down on grounds of insufficient integration 
(van Oers, de Hart, and Groenendijk 2007), whereas in France the share of 
applicants turned down because of insufficient assimilation was 10 per cent (Weil 
and Spire 2007). Since 2003, language requirements have been tightened and a 
formal test has to be passed, which also includes some questions on Dutch 
society. In France, linguistic and cultural assimilation is assessed in a personal 
interview with a civil servant. In Germany, applicants must have completed four 
years of schooling in Germany, have a certificate from a German language 
school, or demonstrate equivalent proficiency in a formal language exam. These 
policy differences are reflected in naturalization rates, which have been highest in 
the Netherlands and lowest in Germany. The average yearly rate for the period 
2000-2004 was 6.3 percent for the Netherlands, 4.2 percent for France and 2.1 
percent for Germany (Bauböck et al. 2006: 298-299).  
Second, regarding access to resources, France and Germany are less accommo-
dating of immigrants' ethnic culture and religion than the Netherlands. Dutch 
legislation offers relatively much room for the public expression of particularistic 
identities (Entzinger 2005). Legislation originating in the time of "pillarization" 
(Lijphart 1968) allowed for the set-up of fully publicly funded Islamic and Hindu 
schools and broadcasting corporations. Currently, there are about 45 publicly 
funded Islamic schools in the Netherlands, against one in Germany and France. 
Moreover, many non-denominational public schools in areas with large Muslim 
populations offer Islamic religious education classes, whereas in Germany this is 
only the case in Berlin, and nowhere in France. Regarding the media, the Dutch 
national public broadcaster NPS is required by law to direct twenty percent of its 
programmes to ethnic minority audiences.2 In addition, there are "multicultural" 
broadcasters on the local level. By contrast, special public media organizations or 
broadcasts for immigrant groups are rare in Germany (the main exception being 
Berlin's currently threatened Radio Multikulti) and absent in France (where public 
media are required by law to broadcast only in French). In addition, the Nether-
lands has an extensive system of subsidized ethnic consultative bodies. Germa-
ny has local consultative bodies, the Ausländerbeiräte. However, in Germany all 
immigrant groups are represented in one advisory council, whereas in the 
Netherlands there are separate consultation bodies for each major ethnic group 
(e.g., Turks, Surinamese, Chinese). All three countries have recently initiated 
some form of consultation of Muslim organizations. However, while in the 
Netherlands Muslim organizations can appoint the members of the body, and in 
                                                     
 2 See the yearly reports ‘Multiculturele programmering’ of the public broadcasting orga-
nizations, e.g. http://pics.portal.omroep.nl/upnos/ZakoiolHC_RAP_MC2004_21.pdf, 
accessed 29 October 2008. 
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France it is elected by individual Muslims, in Germany the Minister of the Interior 
appoints the members of the Islamkonferenz, which as a result includes several 
unaffiliated secular persons from a Muslim background, who are very critical of 
the role of Muslim organizations.3 
Third and finally, there are significant differences in the degree to which 
expressions of religious faith can be a barrier to full participation in public life. The 
Netherlands gives most room for Muslims to publicly practice and express their 
religion. The wearing of headscarves of both students and teachers is allowed 
without restrictions in public schools (and obviously also in Muslim schools). Only 
for certain positions within the civil service (the courts and the police) there is a 
ban on headscarves and other religious signs. In France, the headscarf is not 
allowed for civil servants, primary and secondary school students or teachers. 
Contrary to France, students in Germany are allowed to wear a headscarf, but in 
the majority of federal states teachers and other civil servants are not. While in 
France the ban on headscarves in public schools follows from a law affecting all 
"ostentatious" religions symbols and in that sense treats Islam and other religions 
alike, various Southern German states have banned Muslim headscarves, while 
nuns teaching in public schools can wear their habits. This inequality is also 
reflected in the fact that Christian denominations and Judaism are officially 
recognized as corporations under public law (Körperschaften des öffentlichen 
Rechts), which among other things implies that the government levies church 
taxes for these religious communities, whereas Islam lacks this recognized status 
and Muslims have therefore experienced great difficulties in obtaining equal 
rights, for instance related to the allowance of halal slaughter of animals 
(Laurence 2006). Especially Christian-Democratic politicians have argued that 
Germany has a Christian tradition that should not be banned from public life 
(Mannitz 2004).  
Combining these three dimensions, we can conclude that access to rights, 
resources, and public institutions is most clearly tied to giving up the ethnic 
culture and adopting the host-country culture in Germany, and least so in the 
Netherlands. In many cases, immigrants in the Netherlands can even claim state 
funding and institutional rights on the basis of their ethnicity or religion, e.g., in 
the form of faith schools, public media access, consultation rights, and orga-
nizational subsidies. We assume that the lower the penalties (in the form of 
barriers to the acquisition of rights and to participation in public institutions) and 
the higher the rewards (in the form of claims to public funding and institutional 
rights) attached to it, the greater will be the degree of ethnic retention in a 
country; we therefore hypothesize that: 
H1:  Rates of ethnic retention will be highest in the Netherlands, 
intermediate in France, and lowest in Germany.  
                                                     
 3 See http://www.bmi.bund.de/nn_121560/Internet/Navigation/DE/Themen/Deutsche 
__Islam__Konferenz/deutscheIslamKonferenz__node.html__nnn=true, accessed 29 
October 2008. 
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As a corollary, we expect that host-country adoption will be stronger, the greater 
are the material rewards attached to it (in the form of access to rights and public 
institutions; obviously none of the countries penalize host-culture adoption); 
therefore: 
H2a: Rates of host-culture adoption will be highest in Germany, 
intermediate in France, and lowest in the Netherlands.  
However, besides the material costs and benefits of ethnic retention and host 
culture adoption, social-psychological studies have pointed towards the 
emotional costs involved in balancing ethnic and host-culture orientations, often 
labelled as "acculturative stress" (Berry et al. 1987). The emotional well-being 
and life satisfaction of immigrants can be negatively affected if they perceive a 
strong cultural conflict between the demands of their or their parents’ ethnic 
culture and the cultural demands that the host society makes on them (see e.g., 
Berry 1997; Verkuyten and Nekuee 1999). Berry (1994: 214) suggests that the 
extent to which such cultural tensions are felt depends on the integration policies 
pursued by the country of immigration: “One might reasonably expect the stress 
of persons experiencing acculturation in plural societies to be lower than those in 
monistic societies that pursue assimilation. [..] If a person regularly receives the 
message that one’s culture, language, and identity are unacceptable, the impact 
on one’s sense of security and self-esteem will clearly be negative. If one is told 
that the price of admission to full participation in the larger society is to no longer 
be what one has grown up to be, the psychological conflict is surely heightened.”  
Following Berry, we assume that the emotional costs of both ethnic retention and 
host-culture adoption will be greater the more the two are depicted as 
contradictory in the receiving country's integration approach. Among our three 
countries, this is most clearly the case in Germany, indicated for instance by the 
unequal legal status of Islam and the official insistence in the Southern federal 
states that Germany is a Christian country. Until 2000, German naturalization 
guidelines explicitly viewed commitment to Germany and to the country and 
culture of origin as mutually exclusive: "the voluntary and permanent commitment 
to Germany shall be judged from his fundamental attitude with regard to the 
German cultural realm [deutscher Kulturkreis]. A permanent commitment is 
principally not to be assumed when the applicant is active in a political emigrant 
organization" (naturalization guidelines, as cited in Hailbronner and Renner 1998: 
866; our translation from the German). The mutually exclusive view that prevails 
in Germany regarding ethnic and host-culture orientations is also shown in the 
country's rejection of dual nationality, which is only granted on exceptional 
grounds and in a minority of naturalisations. This also applies to the second 
generation, who since 2000 are automatically granted German citizenship (if the 
parents have lived in Germany for at least eight years), but on the condition that 
they give up their parents' nationality at majority. By contrast, France fully allows 
dual nationality, and the Netherlands allow it de jure for the second and de facto 
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for the large majority of first-generation naturalizations, including virtually all 
naturalized Turks (Böcker, Groenendijk, and de Hart 2005).  
In France, ethnic and host-culture orientations are less mutually exclusive than in 
Germany to the extent that dual nationality is allowed and the reluctance to 
accept expressions of linguistic and religious difference in the public sphere 
affects both immigrant groups and autochtonous groups (e.g., Catholics or 
Bretons). However, France’s emphasis on a unitary public culture, exemplified by 
the headscarf ban, may create emotional conflicts for immigrants who want to 
participate in French public life but also want to maintain their ethnic and religious 
traditions. Dutch policies, finally, offer official recognition and subsidization of 
religious schools, ethnic media and immigrant associations, and comparatively 
strong protection for the right to publicly express religious differences. We 
therefore assume that acculturative stress in the form of experienced conflicts 
between commitment to the ethnic and the host-country cultures will be most 
prevalent in Germany and least in the Netherlands, with France in an 
intermediary position. For ethnic retention, this leads to the same prediction 
regarding country differences as the one (H1) we specified above on the basis of 
material costs and benefits. The less integration policies convey that ethnic 
retention contradicts commitment to and participation in the host country, the 
lower will be the emotional costs of ethnic retention. We therefore again expect 
that ethnic retention will be highest in the Netherlands, intermediate in France, 
and lowest in Germany. 
For host-culture adoption, however, the focus on emotional costs leads to a 
different prediction than the focus on material costs and benefits. The less 
integration policies convey that adoption of the host-country culture requires 
distancing oneself from the ethnic culture, the lower will be the emotional cost 
experienced when adopting elements of the host culture. Conversely, where 
host-culture adoption is seen as requiring abandonment of the ethnic culture, 
adoption may be felt as a form of treason to one's own or one's family's cultural 
origins. The idea of ethnic and host-country cultural orientations as mutually 
exclusive is strongest in Germany and weakest (though not entirely absent) in the 
Netherlands; we therefore expect that:  
H2b: Rates of host-culture adoption will be highest in the Netherlands, 
intermediate in France, and lowest in Germany. 
Combining material costs and benefits and emotional costs, we thus arrive at a 
uniform prediction for cross-country differences in ethnic retention (H1), but for 
host-country adoption the material and emotional perspectives lead to contrary 
predictions (H2a and H2b).  
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Research design 
Comparative survey studies of immigrant integration usually rely either on 
independently gathered national immigrant surveys with divergent questions and 
sampling methods, or on cross-national surveys such as the European Social 
Survey that are not specifically targeted at immigrants, who therefore tend to be 
strongly underrepresented, among other things because the questionnaire is only 
offered in the host country language. These studies moreover face the problem 
of widely diverging compositions of the immigrant population across countries. 
The resulting composition effects can only approximately be controlled 
statistically. For instance, representative surveys will include hardly any 
Bangladeshis outside, and virtually no Turks within the United Kingdom. Second, 
there is often important variation among immigrants from the same country of 
origin, both in terms of the timing and type (guest-worker, family formation, 
asylum, etc.) of immigration, and in terms of regions of origin within sending 
countries, which differ in terms of modernization, religiosity, and ethnic 
composition. Existing cross-national surveys rarely contain information on the 
region of origin and often lack information on the timing and type of immigration 
(see also Crul and Vermeulen 2003).  
By conducting our own survey we avoid dependence on cross-nationally varying 
sample-selection criteria, interviewing techniques, and question wordings. To 
control for composition effects, we do not use a representative survey of all 
immigrant groups, but circumscribe our target group in a number of ways. First 
we focus on immigrants from the same country, Turkey, which is the most 
important country of origin of immigrants in the EU (Lederer 1997). With about 
2.5 million people of Turkish origin, Germany has been the main destination of 
Turkish migration. France and the Netherlands follow with each about 350,000 
people of Turkish descent (De Tapia 2001). Since Turkey has never been 
colonized by nor shares a language with any of the host countries, Turkish 
immigrants form a relatively comparable group. A further reason to choose Turks 
is that they are predominantly Muslim. The debate on cultural integration in 
Europe focuses heavily on Muslims, and it is especially Islamic culture that is 
seen by some as being at odds with Western culture. 
Patterns of Turkish migration to European countries were not identical. After the 
guest-worker recruitment stop (around 1974), they diverged due to differences in 
family migration regulations, residence permit policies, and the differential inflow 
of asylum seekers (see e.g. Muus 2003; Dagevos et al. 2006). This has led to 
cross-national differences in the make-up of the Turkish community. To control 
for this type of composition effects, we limit the target population to immigrants 
who arrived before 1975, as well as their offspring. Immigrants who arrived as 
adults after 1975, mostly as spouses or asylum seekers, are not included in our 
sample.  
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In addition, we control for differences in regional origins of Turkish immigrants. 
Turkey shows large regional differences in prosperity, religious life, ethnic compo-
sition, degree of urbanization and levels of education. These differences within 
Turkey may be an important disturbing factor for cross-national comparison 
because the Turkish populations in different immigration countries often come 
from specific parts of the country, which may affect cross-national differences in 
integration outcomes (Böcker and Thränhardt 2003; Dagevos et al. 2006). To 
avoid that regional differences in Turkey confound our cross-national 
comparison, we limit the target group to migrants from two rural regions in 
Central Turkey, South-Central and East-Central Anatolia.4 
On the side of destination countries, we employ a “most-similar systems design” 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970), in which cases resemble each other on many 
potentially relevant variables, but differ as much as possible on the independent 
variable of theoretical interest. Whereas Germany, France, and the Netherlands 
have different integration approaches, they are relatively similar where a number 
of other potentially important influences on immigrant integration are concerned. 
All three became immigration countries at around the same time in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, and halted guest-worker recruitment after the 1973 Oil Crisis. In 
that respect, they differ importantly both from long-standing immigration countries 
such as the United States or Australia, and from countries that have only recently 
become immigration countries such as Ireland or Spain. Further, they have 
developed welfare states, distinguishing them both from the United Kingdom and 
the Southern European countries with their lean welfare states, but also from the 
more generous Scandinavian welfare states (Esping-Anderson 1990).  
Data collection and variables 
Sampling and data collection 
In the Netherlands it would have been possible to rely on population registries to 
sample people of Turkish descent. In France and Germany, however, ethnic 
background is not registered. Therefore, we had to choose other ways to draw a 
cross-nationally comparable sample. Our main method was sampling from online 
phonebooks, based on stems of common Turkish surnames. Surname-based 
sampling from phonebooks has been shown to be an efficient and representative 
method for the study of immigrant populations in general, and Turks in particular 
(see Galonska, Berger, and Koopmans 2003; Granato 1999; Humpert and 
Schneiderheinze 2000; Salentin 1999). Still, this method might have a bias since 
                                                     
 4 South-Central Anatolia consists of the provinces Afyon, Aksaray, Karaman, Kayseri, 
Konya, Nevşehir, and Niğde. East-Central Anatolia encompasses Adiyaman, 
Amasya, Elaziğ, Malatya, Tokat, Tunceli and Sivas. 
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not all Turkish immigrant households are listed in the phonebook and those listed 
may differ from those who are not. Therefore we used supplementary sampling 
techniques. In the summer of 2005, towns and villages in the Turkish provinces 
of Karaman and Sivas were visited. Migrants who spent their holidays in their 
hometowns were asked to provide their phone number to be contacted later for 
the survey.5 This sample may also contain a bias, since only immigrants who 
have maintained a connection to their region of origin are included. Finally, we 
used a snowball technique by asking respondents for phone numbers of relatives 
and friends from the same region of origin. Snowball sampling is often criticized 
for violating the random sample assumption. None of the three sampling 
techniques is therefore free of potential biases. In all the regressions reported 
below, dummy variables were included to control for the sampling technique by 
which a respondent was recruited. We find no significant differences between the 
three subsamples in any of our regressions.  
Data were collected between November 2005 and June 2006 by means of a 
standardized phone survey, using bilingual interviewers and questionnaires, 
allowing respondents to choose between Turkish and the language of the host 
country. At the start of each contact, filter questions were asked about regional 
origin and the timing of the migration of the respondent or his or her parents. 
Only those who fulfilled our target population criteria were interviewed, totalling 
941 respondents: 259 in the Netherlands, 282 in Germany and 400 in France.  
Dependent variables 
We analyze eight dependent variables covering four areas of ethnic retention and 
host culture adoption (Table A in the Appendix gives the means and standard 
deviations for all dependent and independent variables used in the analyses): 
1. Host-country and Turkish identification. Respondents were asked several 
questions on the strength of their identification with the host society and with 
Turkey or Turks: “To what extent do you feel connected to [group]?,” “To what 
extent do you feel [group member]?,” and “To what extent are you proud of 
being [group member]?”. Answer categories ranged from 1 “not at all” to 5 
“completely”. Average scores across these items were summarized into two 
scales for host-country identification (Cronbach’s alpha .78) and Turkish 
identification (alpha .68). 
2. Host-country and Turkish language proficiency and use. Proficiency in the 
host country language and in Turkish was measured by asking respondents 
how often they experienced problems in understanding these languages. 
Respondents could answer along a 5-point scale. For analysis, we used 
inverse scores so that a score of 1 means that a respondent “always” has 
                                                     
 5 Massey et al. (1994) also used a home-country sample for their study on Mexican 
migrants to the U.S. 
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problems understanding the respective language and 5 means he or she 
“never” experiences such problems.6 Language use was measured by asking 
respondents which language they spoke most frequently in three different 
contexts, namely with their friends, partner, and children: Turkish, the host 
country language, or both about equally often. Answers were scored 
0 “always Turkish,” .5 “equally often Turkish and French/Dutch/German” and 
1 “always French/Dutch/German.” Average scores across these three 
questions were combined in a scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of .66.7 
3. Interethnic social contacts. Respondents were asked about the ethnic compo-
sition of the social group they went out with. Answer categories were 1 “pre-
dominantly Turkish,” 2 “about equally mixed,” and 3 “predominantly people of 
Dutch/German/French descent.”8  
4. Religious identification and observance. Religious identification was 
measured analogously to host-country and Turkish identification on the basis 
of three questions: “To what extent do you feel connected to Muslims?,” “To 
what extent do you feel Muslim?” and “To what extent are you proud of being 
a Muslim?”. Answers could range from 1 “not at all” to 5 “completely.” The 
items were combined in a scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of .80. Religious 
observance was measured by four questions, asking respondents about how 
often they eat halal food, participate in Ramadan, wear a headscarf (or for 
males: have a partner who wears a headscarf), and visit a mosque. Answer 
categories for the first three items were 1 “never,” 2 “sometimes,” 3 “most of 
the time,” and 4 “always.” The scale for mosque visits ranged from 1 “never” 
to 6 “daily”. The z-scores of these items were averaged and combined in a 
scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of .77.9 Those – very few – respondents who 
defined themselves as non-religious or who adhered to another faith than 
Islam were excluded from the analysis of the religion variables. 
Independent variables 
Country of residence: dummy variables for respondents living in the Netherlands 
and France were included in each reported regression, with effects denoting the 
difference with Turks living in Germany, the reference category. Additional 
regressions were undertaken to check for the significance of the contrast 
                                                     
 6 Van Tubergen and Kalmijn (2005) found that self-assessed language proficiency is a 
reliable measure of language proficiency. 
 7 For respondents without a partner or children, the scale was based on the average of 
the remaining items.  
 8 The middle category includes a small number of respondents (n = 93), who indicated 
that the majority of their social contacts were with members of other immigrant groups 
than Turks. We also ran the analyses excluding this group and found similar results 
as those reported below. 
 9 For male respondents without a partner, the scale excluded the headscarf question 
and was based on the average of the remaining items. 
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between French and Dutch Turks. If this contrast is significant, we indicate this in 
the regression tables.  
Region of origin: South-Central Anatolia (the reference category) is a predomi-
nantly ethnic Turkish and religiously Sunnite region. The provinces of Karaman 
and Konya, which form the core of the region, are renowned for their religious 
conservatism. East-Central Anatolia, by contrast, has more ethnic and religious 
diversity (Kurds and Alevis). For respondents born in the host country, the region 
of origin refers to that of the parents.  
Alevi denomination: A dummy is included for respondents who adhere to 
Alevism. The reference category consists of Sunni Muslims and the small group 
(1.6%) of non-religious migrants. Alevism is a humanistic current within Islam. In 
general the relation between the sexes is different from that prevalent within 
Sunni Islam, and Alevi women rarely wear headscarves. According to rough 
estimates, Alevis constitute up to 25 per cent of the Turkish population. In 
Turkey, Alevis sometimes face discrimination because they are not considered to 
be “real” Muslims since they do not visit a mosque or observe Ramadan.  
Generation: Dummy variables were included for the second generation born in 
the host country and for the in-between generation (sometimes also called 1.5th 
generation), who were born in Turkey but migrated before the age of 18. First-
generation immigrants who migrated as adults are the reference category.10 
Sex: A dummy for female respondents is included in the analyses; males are the 
reference category. 
Marital status: A dummy for married respondents is included in the analyses; 
non-married is the reference category.11 
                                                     
 10 Sometimes the distinction between the 1.5th and 2nd generation is made on the 
school career instead of the country of birth. Children who arrived before the age of 
six are then counted as members of the second generation. All analyses in this paper 
have also been conducted using this alternative definition of generational boundaries. 
This produced only minor differences for the variables of interest. For Turkish 
language proficiency, the difference between the two origin regions is no longer 
significant, but Alevis show a significantly lower proficiency (p<.05). The in-between 
generation’s identification with Muslims becomes significantly lower than that of the 
first generation (p<.05). For religious practices, the difference between the first and 
second generation becomes insignificant. For host language proficiency, the dif-
ference between the Netherlands and France decreases to the p<.10 level. Age was 
not included as a control variable because of problems of multicollinearity with the 
generation dummies. However, we did all analyses also with age instead of the 
generation dummies. The only difference in the results was a decrease of the impact 
of education on Turkish language proficiency to the p<.10 level (all results available 
on request). 
 11 We additionally considered whether respondents had children. Parenthood only had a 
significant negative impact on frequency of speaking the host country language 
(p<.001). 
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Level of education: Dummy variables were included for secondary education and 
post-secondary education (college or university). The reference category is “none 
or only primary school.”  
Employment status: A dummy for respondents who are currently employed is in-
cluded in the analyses; those not currently employed are the reference category 
Sampling method: Dummies were included for respondents from the holiday and 
snowball samples. Respondents from the phonebook sample are the reference 
category. 
Relative size of the Turkish immigrant population12: In Germany, the Turkish-
origin population makes up almost three percent of the total population, in the 
Netherlands two percent and in France only about one half of a percent. By 
controlling for differences in ethnic concentration in the analyses reported below 
we ensure that any significant cross-national differences that remain cannot be 
attributed to differences in the relative size and within-country distribution of the 
Turkish immigrant population. Since migrant populations are usually unevenly 
spread across a country, leading to regional differences in concentration, the 
variable is operationalized at the local level. This is also the level where most 
interpersonal contact takes place. We calculated the number of Turkish 
immigrants (excluding the second generation) as a percentage of the total 
population within geographical units. The variable thus varies from 0-100. For the 
Netherlands, data for 2005 on the municipality (gemeente) level were taken from 
the Central Statistical Agency (CBS) website. For France, data from the 1999 
census on the level of the commune were used. For communes with less than 
5,000 inhabitants data on the number of Turkish migrants are not available. For 
these communes we therefore used the percentage of Turkish migrants within 
the respective département. German statistical data are generally collected on 
the basis of nationality. One of the few exceptions is the Mikrozensus, a one-
percent sample of German households. The lowest spatial level for which the 
Mikrozensus allows us to calculate the percentage of Turkish immigrants is the 
Kreis (county) level. For Kreise with 3 or fewer Turks in the Mikrozensus sample, 
the number of Turks is not available. This was only the case for three of the 
respondents in the dataset. 
As table A in the appendix indicates, the average percentage of first-generation 
Turks in the locality in which respondents live is 2.9% in Germany, 2.6% in the 
Netherlands, and 1.3% in France. Comparing these figures to the national-level 
percentages, we can conclude that Turkish immigrants are more strongly 
                                                     
 12 For the adoption variables we also ran analyses using the share of the total immigrant 
population instead of the Turkish immigrant population, following the reasoning that 
adoption might be positively related to the population share of host-country ethnics 
rather than the share of non-Turks. For social contacts  the difference between the 
Netherlands and France then decreases to the p<.10 level. For the other variables 
the results do not change (tables available on request).  
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concentrated in certain geographical areas in France than in the two other 
countries (see also Jund 1992; Özüekren and Kempen 1997).  
Results 
Ethnic retention 
We analyze the data using ordinary least squares regression analysis. We first 
investigate the hypotheses regarding ethnic retention. Hypothesis 1 stated that 
retention would be highest in the Netherlands, intermediary in France, and lowest 
in Germany. Our dependent variables encompass four indicators of cultural 
retention, two referring to the ethnic Turkish culture, and two to Islamic religiosity. 
Table 1 shows the results of regression analyses with as dependent variables 
respondents' identification with Turks, their proficiency in the Turkish language, 
their identification with Muslims, and their degree of Islamic religious observance.  
For identification with Turks, we do not find support for hypothesis 1, as there are 
no significant differences among the three host countries. In fact, in all three 
countries Turkish identification is very strong at an average of 4.46 on the scale 
ranging from 1 "not at all" to 5 "completely." Respondents from East-Central 
Anatolia, where more ethnic minorities, especially Kurds, live, have a significantly 
lower Turkish identification. This is also the case for respondents who belong to 
the Alevi current in Islam, which is not granted an equal status within Turkey. 
However, with an average score of 4.02 even Alevis identify quite strongly with 
Turks. The in-between generation shows a lower degree of identification, but 
remarkably the difference between the second generation and the generation of 
their parents is not significant. The only further significant effect is that Turkish 
identification is lower for people with post-secondary education. 
For Turkish language proficiency we do not find significant cross-national 
differences, either. Members of the 1.5th and 2nd generations report less 
proficiency in Turkish. The more highly educated and the employed also have 
less Turkish proficiency, suggesting a negative relation between socio-economic 
integration and ethnic retention.  
Next, we turn to the two indicators of religious cultural retention. We find that 
identification with Muslims is very strong in all three countries, ranging from a 
score on the five-point scale of 4.32 for German Turks to 4.59 for Dutch Turks. 
These country differences persist when we control for other relevant variables 
(see table 1). In line with hypothesis 1, Dutch Turks identify significantly stronger 
with Muslims than their counterparts in Germany. The difference between French 
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Table 1  Unstandardized coefficients of OLS regression of four measures of 
ethnic retention (Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Turkish 
identification 
Turkish 
language 
proficiency 
Muslim 
identification 
Religious 
observance 
host country 
ref cat: Germany  
    
France  .08  
(.06) 
-.17   
(.09) 
.08  
(.07) 
.20***  
(.06) 
Netherlands .04  
(.06) 
-.02  
(.09) 
.16*  
(.07) 
.25***  
(.06) 
region of origin 
ref cat: South-Central Anatolia 
    
East-Central Anatolia  
 
-.12*  
(.05) 
-.14 
(.07) 
-.12*  
(.05) 
-.09  
(.05) 
denomination of Islam 
ref cat: Sunni 
    
Alevi   -.36***  
(.09) 
-.24  
(.13) 
-.79***  
(.09) 
-1.48***  
(.08) 
Generation 
ref cat: Generation 1 
    
Generation 1.5  -.15*  
(.07) 
-.49***  
(.11) 
-.16  
(.08) 
-.07  
(.07) 
Generation 2 -.09  
(.09) 
-.67***  
(.13) 
-.06  
(.10) 
-.18* 
 (.09) 
Female  -.08  
(.05) 
-.12 
 (.07) 
-.01  
(.05) 
-.27***  
(.05) 
Married -.00  
(.06) 
.15  
(.09) 
-.06  
(.07) 
.01  
(.06) 
Education 
ref cat: non primary 
    
Secondary education -.07  
(.07) 
-.28**  
(.10) 
-.16*  
(.07) 
-.18** 
(.06) 
Post-secondary education -.35***  
(.09) 
-.33*  
(.13) 
-.37***  
(.10) 
-.28**  
(.09) 
Working -.09  
(.05) 
-.17*  
(.07) 
-.12  
(.05) 
-.15**  
(.05) 
Sample 
ref cat: phone book sample 
    
Holiday sample .13 
 (.07) 
-.11  
(.11) 
.07  
(.08) 
.09  
(.07) 
Snowball sample .09  
(.05) 
-.10  
(.07) 
.09  
(.05) 
.02  
(.05) 
%Turkish immigrants .02  
(.02) 
.03  
(.02) 
.04*  
(.02) 
.04*  
(.02) 
Constant 4.69***  
(.11) 
4.80***  
(.16) 
4.74***  
(.12) 
.33** 
(.10) 
Adj. R2 .10 .14 .16 .41 
N 923 922 883 887 
Two-tailed t-tests, * p<.05  ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
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and Dutch Turks is in the expected direction but is not significant. Further, Muslim 
identification is significantly lower among people from East-Central Anatolia, 
among Alevis, and among higher educated and working respondents. The size of 
the Turkish immigrant population has a significant positive impact on religious 
identification. 
Finally, we find significantly less Islamic religious observance among German 
Turks. This is in line with the idea of hypothesis 1 that strong assimilation 
pressures lead to less cultural retention. Dutch and French Turks however do not 
differ significantly. Alevis are much less observant of Islamic religious practices. 
This is unsurprising since they do not pray in the mosque and their religion does 
not prescribe Ramadan or headscarves.13 Further, members of the second 
generation are somewhat less religiously observant, and again we find that there 
is a negative relationship between socio-economic integration and cultural 
retention as indicated by the significant negative effects of education and 
employment on religious observance. Again the relative size of the Turkish 
immigrant population has a significant positive effect. Possibly a larger Turkish 
community increases the possibilities for the set-up of religious institutions which 
in turn generate higher religious observance and identification. Another possibility 
is that social control stimulates religiousness. 
A noteworthy result is finally that female respondents are significantly less 
observant than males. Partly, this is because for Muslim males visiting the 
mosque is a religious duty, whereas it is less so for females. However, inspection 
of results for the individual indicators shows that female respondents also 
practice Ramadan less. Moreover, they indicate significantly less often (at .001 
level) that they themselves wear a headscarf than that male respondents indicate 
that their partner wears a headscarf. Taken together, these results suggest that 
the negative effect that we find for females on religious observance may be due 
to a disproportional non-response among more strictly religiously observing 
women.14  
The general level of religious observance is high. The majority of the respondents 
always eat halal food. This ranges from 72 percent in the Netherlands to 67 
percent in France. The observance of the Ramadan is lowest in Germany; only 
55 percent of Sunnite respondents always observe Ramadan, compared to more 
than 80 percent in France and the Netherlands. Mosque attendance varies little 
between the countries with about 60 percent of males and 10 percent of females 
visiting a mosque at least once a week. Headscarves are worn most in the 
                                                     
 13 Some Alevis pray in the so-called ‘cem evi’ and practice a lent called ‘Muharram’ but 
we did not ask questions about these specific practices. 
 14 We have also run a regression analysis in which for males the wearing of 
headscarves by partners is excluded from the religious observance scale. Other than 
that the difference between the second and first generation is no longer significant, 
the results are the same. 
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Netherlands and least in Germany. In the Netherlands, 50 percent of female 
Sunnite respondents indicate always wearing a headscarf, compared to 40 
percent in France and 30 percent in Germany. 
Summing up, we find partial support for our first hypothesis that cultural retention 
is higher where state integration policies are more accommodating of cultural 
differences and put less emphasis on assimilation. Contrary to hypothesis 1, we 
found no cross-national difference in Turkish identification or Turkish language 
proficiency. However, for the two religious retention variables we did find the 
expected cross-national differences. In line with hypothesis 1, religious obser-
vance and identification of German Turks is significantly lower than that of Dutch 
Turks. French Turks are as expected situated in between the Netherlands and 
Germany, but the differences between French and Dutch Turks are not 
significant.  
Host culture adoption 
We now investigate the merits of our hypotheses regarding adoption of the host 
society culture, which we based respectively on the material benefits (H2a) and 
emotional costs (H2b) of host culture adoption. Here too, we look at four 
indicators: identification with the host country, proficiency and use of the host 
country language, and social contacts with host country ethnics. Table 2 shows 
the results of regressions of these four variables, using the same predictor 
variables as in the analysis of cultural retention.  
We find that host country identification is significantly higher in France and the 
Netherlands than in Germany. This result fits best with the hypothesis based on 
emotional costs (H2b), which predicted the highest level of host country adoption 
in the Netherlands and the lowest level in Germany. Contrary to the hypothesis 
the difference between the Netherlands and France is not significant. Regarding 
host country identification the hypothesis based on material benefits (H2a), which 
predicted that adoption would be highest Germany and lowest in the 
Netherlands, does not receive any support. 
Host country identification does not anywhere come close to the level of Turkish 
identification. Whereas Turkish identification averaged between 4.37 in Germany 
and 4.52 in France, host country identification ranges from 2.31 in Germany to 
2.80 in the Netherlands. Even among the second generation, host country 
identification remains below the scale mid-point of 3.00 in all three countries. 
Completing the picture for identification, we find some significant effects that 
mirror those for ethnic retention. Respondents from East-Central Anatolia, who 
had less strong attachments to Turkish culture, are more likely to identify with the 
host country, as are those with a higher level of education. 
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Table 2  Unstandardized coefficients of OLS regression of four measures of 
host country adoption (Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Host country 
identification 
Host country 
language 
proficiency 
Host language 
use  
Social 
contacts 
host country 
ref cat: Germany  
    
France   .54*** 
(.09) 
.14  
(.08) 
 .11***  
(.02) 
 .13**    
(.05) 
Netherlands  .56*** 
(.09) 
-.03 ª  
(.08) 
-.01 c     
(.02) 
-.04 a     
(.05) 
region of origin 
ref cat: South-Central Anatolia 
    
East-Central Anatolia  
 
 .20**  
(.07) 
.04 
(.07) 
 .05**  
(.02) 
 .07        
(.04) 
denomination of Islam 
ref cat: Sunni 
    
Alevi    .09  
(.12) 
.09  
(.11) 
 .10**  
(.03) 
 .06        
(.07) 
Generation 
ref cat: Generation 1 
    
Generation 1.5   .09  
(.11) 
.65*** 
(.10) 
 .14***  
(.03) 
 .12*      
(.06) 
Generation 2  .22  
(.13) 
.89*** 
(.12) 
 .20*** 
(.03) 
 .04        
(.07) 
Female  -.01  
(.07) 
-.02  
(.06) 
  .05**  
(.02) 
 .00        
(.04) 
Married  .29**  
(.09) 
-.15  
(.08) 
-.22***  
(.02) 
-.07       
(.05) 
Education 
ref cat: non primary 
    
Secondary education  .42*** 
(.10) 
1.05*** 
(.09) 
.18***  
(.03) 
 .20***  
(.06) 
Post-secondary education  .58*** 
(.13) 
1.40*** 
(.12) 
.25***  
(.03) 
 .35***  
(.07) 
Working -.02  
(.07) 
.16*  
(.07) 
.05**    
(.02) 
 .14***   
(.04) 
Sample 
ref cat: phone book sample 
    
Holiday sample  .06  
(.11) 
-.09  
(.10) 
.05       
(.03) 
-.06        
(.06) 
Snowball sample  .01  
(.07) 
 .04  
(.07) 
.04       
(.02) 
 .01    
(.04) 
%Turkish immigrants  .02  
(.02) 
 .00 
(.02) 
-.01* 
(.01) 
-.02  
(.01) 
Constant 1.43*** 
(.15) 
2.39*** 
(.14) 
.16***  
(.04) 
1.31***  
(.09) 
Adj. R2  .09  .42  .40  .09 
N 925 924 924 901 
Two-tailed t-tests, *p<.05  ** p<.01 *** p<.001  
ª the difference between France and the Netherlands is significant (p<.05) 
b the difference between France and the Netherlands is significant (p<.01) 
c the difference between France and Netherlands is significant (p<.001) 
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Regarding proficiency in the host language we find that the only significant cross-
national difference is that between Dutch and French Turks, with the latter 
displaying the highest level of proficiency. German Turks are situated in between. 
This result comes closest to the prediction of the material benefits hypothesis 
(H2a). However, contrary to this hypothesis German Turks have lower levels of 
host language proficiency than French Turks, although this difference is not 
significant. Further effects again mirror those found for ethnic retention. The 1.5th 
and 2nd generations and those who are better socio-economically integrated in 
terms of education and employment, who were less proficient in Turkish, are 
significantly more proficient in the host country language.  
Results for the frequency of host country language use are broadly similar, but 
cross-national differences are stronger, and French Turks are significantly more 
linguistically assimilated than both Dutch and German Turks. This is again most 
in line with the material benefits hypothesis, but again the fit is not perfect 
because German and not French Turks occupy the middle position. The 1.5th 
and 2nd generations, as well as the higher educated and employed, once more 
show higher levels of linguistic assimilation, as do people from East-Central 
Anatolia and Alevis. Women are also more likely to use the host country 
language, which may again be due to an underrepresentation of more traditional 
women in our sample, and married people use the host country language less 
often.15 Finally, the frequency of speaking the host country language is lower in 
towns with a relatively larger Turkish community. Among the 1st and 1.5th 
generations, Turkish is the dominant language in all three countries. Country 
differences in language use are particularly pronounced in the second 
generation. On a scale from 0 (always Turkish) to 1 (always the host country 
language) Turkish is still slightly dominant among the Dutch second generation 
(.46), compared to exactly equal shares in Germany (.50) and a strong 
predominance of French language use with the partner, children and friends 
among the French-Turkish second generation (.65).  
Our final indicator of host culture adoption refers to private social contacts with 
host country ethnics. The results are very similar to those for language. French 
Turks have significantly higher shares of host country ethnics among the people 
they go out with than their counterparts in the Netherlands and Germany. This 
result is again most in line with the material benefits hypothesis (H2a), but once 
more German Turks deviate from the prediction of this hypothesis. The higher 
educated and employed have significantly higher levels of interethnic contacts. 
Again, the orientation of social contacts is predominantly towards other Turks, 
ranging from 1.57 on the scale from 1 (only Turks) to 3 (only host country ethnics) 
for German Turks to 1.69 for French Turks. Even among the 1.5th and 2nd 
generations who were raised in whole or in part in the country of residence, the 
clear majority of social contacts remain with other Turks, although in all three 
                                                     
 15 This effect is also present when only the language spoken with friends is analyzed. 
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countries the orientation towards host country ethnics is slightly stronger than it is 
among the first generation. The relative size of the Turkish population does not 
have a significant impact on interethnic social contacts. 
Summing up, we find that the pattern for host country identification deviates from 
that for the language and social contact variables. The results for host country 
identification come close to the prediction of the emotional cost hypothesis, which 
states that host country culture adoption is less likely in contexts where host 
society and ethnic orientations are seen as mutually exclusive. French Turks, 
however, display higher levels of host country identification than this hypothesis 
led us to expect. The results for the language variables and for social contacts 
better fit the predictions of the material benefits hypothesis, which states that host 
country culture adoption is more likely in contexts where cultural assimilation is a 
precondition for access to rights, resources and public institutions, However, 
Germany deviates from the predictions of this hypothesis, with relatively low 
levels of linguistic and social assimilation that are not significantly different from 
those found in the Netherlands. This suggests that the counteracting material 
benefits and emotional cost mechanisms may both be relevant. This would 
explain why both the combination of high material benefits with high emotional 
costs in Germany, and that of low emotional costs with low material benefits in 
the Netherlands have been less effective in stimulating Turkish immigrants and 
their descendants to orient themselves on the host society culture than the 
French approach that uses both a carrot and a stick by stimulating assimilation 
but limiting its emotional costs.  
The relation between ethnic retention and host culture adoption 
Drawing on the work of Berry (2001; Berry et al. 2006) we have assumed that 
ethnic retention and host culture adoption can vary independently from one 
another in the sense that more of the one does not need to imply less of the 
other. Following this idea, we have, where this was relevant, operationalized our 
indicators of retention and adoption in such a way that they are logically 
independent. We asked separate questions about host society, Turkish, and 
Muslim identification, allowing respondents to identify equally strongly with all 
three categories. Similarly, language proficiency was asked separately for 
Turkish and the host country language, allowing respondents to indicate 
proficiency in both. For other indicators, there either was no equivalent on the 
other side of the equation (religious observance has no equivalent on the 
adoption side, unless we would consider conversion to Christianity, of which we 
did not have any cases in our sample), or the indicator considered did not allow 
maximization of both orientations at the same time. Language use is by definition 
a matter of choice. In any context, the more one uses the one language, the less 
one uses the other (even if this may take the form of mixing languages in one 
conversation). The same is true for social contacts. Any person can only go out 
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with a limited number of friends and acquaintances – with obvious individual 
variation in the degree of sociality.  
Looking at the correlations between our measures of retention and adoption 
allows us to investigate to what extent assimilation is primarily a substitutive 
process, in which host culture adoption is negatively related to ethnic retention, or 
whether it is more of an additive process, in which there is a positive synergy, or 
at least no negative trade-off, between ethnic retention and host culture adoption.  
Table 3  Correlation matrix of ethnic retention and host country adoption 
variables 
 Turkish 
identifi-
cation 
Turkish 
language 
proficiency 
Muslim 
identifi-
cation 
Religious 
practice 
Host-
country 
identifi-
cation 
Host-
country 
language 
proficiency 
Host-
country 
language 
usage 
Turkish 
identifi-
cation 
1       
Turkish 
language 
proficiency 
  .21*** 1      
Muslim 
identifi-
cation 
  .49***   .14*** 1     
Religious 
practice   .36***   .19***   .57*** 1    
Host-
country 
identifi-
cation 
-.16*** -.09** -.15*** -.14*** 1   
Host 
country 
language 
proficiency 
-.17*** -.18*** -.17*** -.20***   .20*** 1  
Host-
country 
language 
usage 
-.33*** -.40*** -.26*** -.32***   .32*** .48*** 1 
Interethnic 
social 
contacts 
-.26*** -.17*** -.22*** -.26***   .29*** .25*** .36*** 
This can be empirically assessed by looking at the correlations among our 
indicators of retention and adoption. Table 3 shows the correlation matrix among 
the eight dependent variables. All four retention variables correlate positively with 
one another, as do the four adoption variables (all p<.001), suggesting that these 
indicators tap common underlying traits. Indeed, it is possible to construct 
moderately strong scales from the retention and adoption variables (using 
standardized scores both scales have a Cronbach’s alpha of .65). By contrast, 
every single pair wise correlation between retention and adoption variables turns 
out to be significantly negative. Although our indicators of identification allowed 
optimally for the expression of a bicultural orientation, we find that in practice host 
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country identification correlates negatively with Turkish (-.16, p<.001) and Muslim 
identification (-.15, p<.01). The same is true for language, where we find a 
negative correlation between Turkish and host country proficiency (-.18, p<.001). 
Closer inspection for subgroups of respondents (results not displayed in the 
table) reveals some indications of a less exclusive relationship between retention 
and adoption. Among Dutch Turks, we find, in line with what the emotional cost 
hypothesis would lead us to expect, no significant correlations between host 
country, and Muslim and Turkish identification, or between Turkish and Dutch 
language proficiency. With regard to correlations among these indicators, the 
Dutch multicultural approach thus seems to have achieved its aim of not forcing a 
choice between an orientation on the ethnic culture and on the host-country 
culture. Across all three countries, the second generation shows less evidence of 
mutually exclusive orientations, as we find no significant correlations for this 
generation between host country and Turkish or Muslim identification and 
between Turkish and host country language proficiency.  
However, correlations among other indicators of retention and adoption are 
consistently and significantly negative. More religiously observant Muslims are 
less proficient in the host language (-.20), use it less frequently (-.32), and have 
fewer social contacts with host country ethnics (-.26, all p<.001). Interethnic 
social contacts also correlate negatively with Turkish proficiency (-.17) and with 
Turkish (-.26) and Muslim identification (-.22, all p<.001). These negative 
relationships hold significantly in all three countries – although in the Netherlands 
the correlation between interethnic social contacts and Muslim identification is 
only significant at the p<.10 level – and mostly also for the second generation. 
Among the second generation, host language proficiency does not correlate 
significantly with religious identification and observance. Muslim identification and 
observance among the second generation are however negatively correlated with 
host language use (respectively-.16, p<.01 and -.21, p<.001) and with interethnic 
social contacts (respectively -.22, and -.26, both p<.001). 
All in all, with a few exceptions for the second generation and for Dutch Turks, 
ethnic retention and host country adoption are significantly negatively related to 
one another. This finding is corroborated by the fact that it is possible to construct 
a good scale (Cronbach’s alpha .74) out of all eight items, which indicates that 
retention and adoption to an important extent measure the same underlying 
syndrome of cultural assimilation, in which substitution is more common than the 
addition of ethnic and host culture orientations.  
While the results of the correlation and reliability analyses indicate that on the 
individual level retention and adoption are negatively correlated, this does not 
necessarily mean that there is a direct causal link between them. We may also 
be dealing with a spurious relationship that is caused by other variables, which 
affect both adoption and retention. For instance, exposure to higher education, 
employment, and birth in the host country may simultaneously weaken ties to the  
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Table 4  Unstandardized coefficients of OLS regression of retention and 
adoption scales (Standard errors in parentheses) 
 Retention Adoption 
host country 
ref cat: Germany  
    
France    .09  
(.06) 
 .21***  
(.05) 
 .31***  
(.05) 
  .34***  
(.05) 
Netherlands  .15*  
(.06) 
 .21***  
(.05) 
 .15 b  
(.05) 
 .19** c  
(.05) 
region of origin 
ref cat: South-Central Anatolia 
    
East-Central Anatolia  
 
-.15**  
(.05) 
-.10*  
(.04) 
 .13**  
(.04) 
 .08*  
(.04) 
denomination of Islam 
ref cat: Sunni 
    
Alevi   -.88*** 
(.08) 
-.83***  
(.07) 
 .14  
(.07) 
-.13  
(.07) 
Generation 
ref cat: Generation 1 
    
Generation 1.5  -.25***  
(.07) 
-.13*  
(.07) 
 .33***  
(.06) 
 .25***  
(.06) 
Generation 2 -.29**  
(.08) 
-.13  
(.08) 
 .42***  
(.08) 
 .33***  
(.07) 
Female  -.13**  
(.05) 
-.12**  
(.04) 
 .03  
(.04) 
 -.01  
(.04) 
Married  .02  
(.06) 
-.05  
(.05) 
-.17** 
(.05) 
-.16**  
(.05) 
Education 
ref cat: non primary 
    
Secondary education -.19** 
(.06) 
  .02  
(.06) 
 .56*** 
(.06) 
.50***  
(.05) 
Post-secondary education -.45***  
(.08) 
-.16  
(.08) 
 .78***  
(.07) 
.65***  
(.07) 
Working -.16***  
(.05) 
-.12**  
(.04) 
 .12**  
(.04) 
.07  
(.04) 
Sample 
ref cat: phone book sample 
    
Holiday sample .09  
(.07) 
 .09  
(.07) 
 .01  
(.06) 
 .04  
(.06) 
Snowball sample .06  
(.05) 
 .08  
(.04) 
 .04  
(.04) 
 .06  
(.04) 
%Turkish immigrants .04**  
(.02) 
 .04*  
(.01) 
-.01  
(.01) 
 .00  
(.01) 
Adoption - -.38***  
(.03) 
- - 
Retention - - - -.30***  
(.03) 
Constant  .44***  
(.10) 
 .10 
(.10) 
-.90*** 
 (.09) 
-.77***  
(.08) 
Adj. R2 .28 .36 .38 .45 
N  925 925 925 925 
Two-tailed t-tests, *p < .05  ** p <  .01 *** p< .001 
ª the difference between France and the Netherlands is significant (p<.05) 
b the difference between France and the Netherlands is significant (p<.01) 
c the difference between France and Netherlands is significant (p<.001) 
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Turkish and Islamic culture, while fostering the adoption of the host culture. To 
check for this possibility, we conducted regression analyses with the adoption 
and retention scales as the dependent variables, and using all the independent 
variables from previous analyses, while adding adoption as a predictor variable of 
retention, and retention as a predictor of adoption. If the relationship between 
retention and adoption would be entirely spurious, adding the one variable to the 
regression of the other should have no additional effect, but in fact we find that 
they are an important predictor variable in both regressions (see Table 4). In 
other words, those who show higher levels of ethnic retention tend to have lower 
levels of host culture adoption and the other way around, even if we control for 
generation, socio-economic integration, and other background variables. 
Discussion and conclusions 
In this study, we have analyzed ethnic retention and host culture adoption among 
Turkish immigrants in Germany, France and the Netherlands. By limiting our 
research population to Turkish guest-workers and their offspring who migrated 
before 1975 and who originated in two selected rural regions in Turkey, we have 
excluded by design several confounding factors related to regional origin and the 
timing and type of immigration. Even after eliminating much of such variation, our 
study still reveals important differences between the two regions of origin, as well 
as between Sunni and Alevi Muslims, a factor that has hardly received attention 
in earlier quantitative research. We additionally controlled for a range of further 
variables that might affect ethnic retention and host-culture adoption, including 
gender and marital status, level of education and employment status, and the 
concentration of Turkish immigrants in the respondents local environment. 
A first important result of our study is that across all three immigration countries 
the degree of ethnic retention among Turkish immigrants and their descendants 
is high and the level of orientation on the host country culture is substantially 
lower. Turks in Germany, France, and the Netherlands identify much more 
strongly as Turks and as Muslims than as nationals of their countries of 
residence. They predominantly speak Turkish, and social contacts tend to be 
primarily with other Turks. Finally, we everywhere find relatively high levels of 
observance of Islamic religious practices. These similarities notwithstanding, we 
also found several significant differences across countries. We structured our 
analysis according to three hypotheses.  
The first hypothesis was that ethnic retention is facilitated by policies that set up 
few cultural barriers to the acquisition of rights and for participation in public life, 
and provide access to resources based on particularistic identities. In line with 
this hypothesis, we found that ethnic retention in the form of comparatively strong 
Muslim identification and more frequent observance of Islamic religious practices 
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such as wearing a headscarf or visiting the mosque was strongest in the 
Netherlands. For both measures Germany had the lowest scores. Although the 
difference between the Netherlands and France was in the expected direction, it 
did not reach statistical significance, despite the more limited room for religious 
practice in France. Further research is needed to explore the reasons behind this 
finding. 
Our second set of hypotheses reflected two different expectations about the 
relationship between immigrant integration policies and the degree of host culture 
adoption. The first hypothesis (H2a) predicted that the greater the material 
benefits of host culture adoption, the higher the level of adoption. Because in 
Germany access to rights for immigrants has been most strongly tied to 
assimilation criteria and in the Netherlands this has been least the case, this 
hypothesis led us to expect the highest levels of adoption among German Turks 
and the lowest levels among Dutch Turks. The second hypothesis (H2b) 
predicted that host culture adoption is affected by the degree to which host 
country and ethnic orientations are defined as contradictory or as complementary 
in a country’s integration philosophy. Over most of the recent decades, the view 
of ethnic and host country orientations as mutually exclusive has been most 
predominant in Germany and least so in the Netherlands. The emotional cost 
hypothesis therefore leads us to expect the highest levels of host country culture 
adoption in the Netherlands, and the lowest levels of adoption in Germany. Our 
results suggest that both mechanisms may be operating simultaneously. In line 
with the material benefits hypothesis, Dutch Turks showed lower levels of host 
country language ability and use, and less interethnic social contacts than French 
Turks. However, contrary to this hypothesis German Turks performed worse than 
French Turks. In line with the emotional cost hypothesis, Dutch and French Turks 
had higher levels of host country identification than German Turks, and German 
Turks had less interethnic social contacts and less often used the host country 
language than French Turks. However, contrary to this hypothesis Dutch Turks 
showed similarly low levels of linguistic assimilation and interethnic social 
contacts as German Turks. 
These results suggest that making a certain degree of assimilation a precondition 
for access to certain rights may promote host culture adoption, but they also 
indicate that when assimilation demands get nativist ethno-cultural overtones and 
explicitly require the rejection of ethnic and religious attachments, as has been 
and sometimes still is the case in Germany, they are not successful in stimulating 
host culture adoption, presumably because the emotional costs become too high.  
An alternative explanation of the comparatively low degree of host culture 
adoption in the Netherlands could be that immigrants in this country show signs 
of “reactive ethnicity” in response to the change in discourse on immigrants that 
was initiated by the rise of right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn in 2002. Reactive 
ethnicity theory argues that anti-immigrant sentiments in public discourse can 
lead immigrants to reinforce their ethnic identity and turn away from mainstream 
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society (see e.g. Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Negative discourse about 
immigrant cultures could create more acculturative stress and raise the emotional 
costs of host culture adoption.  
If current anti-immigrant discourse has an impact on retention or adoption, the 
most likely effect would be on identification. Reactive ethnicity theory mainly 
predicts an identity shift, though behavioural shifts (choice of language, 
observance of customs) can follow. However, it is precisely on host country 
identification that Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands perform best in our data, 
and Turkish identification shows no significant cross-national differences. Four-
yearly data from the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning agency (SCP) on several 
indicators of socio-cultural integration show no trend toward ethnic retention after 
2001. Between 1998 and 2002 host country language proficiency and host 
country language use increased while religiosity stayed at a similar level. Data for 
1994-2006 show that the level of interethnic contacts was fairly stable (SCP 
2007). A study among youth of Turkish and Moroccan origin in the city of 
Rotterdam showed a modest rise in the identification with the Netherlands 
between 1999 and 2006 (Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008), though the study did 
indicate a rise in religious observance. Not only is there little evidence for a 
recent orientation shift in the Netherlands, the relatively low score on adoption for 
immigrants in the Netherlands can only be explained by reactive ethnicity if the 
discourse in the Netherlands would be more negative than in the other two 
countries. The discourse on immigrants in France and Germany can hardly be 
called more “positive” than Dutch discourse. If negative debates on Islam lead to 
a higher observance of Islamic practice than one would expect a higher degree of 
religious observance in France since this is the country with the most limitations 
on wearing a headscarf and on the construction of mosques. 
We drew further insights from the intra-individual correlations between indicators 
of ethnic retention and host culture adoption. Contrary to the idea that ethnic and 
host culture orientations are complementary or even synergetic, we found that 
respondents with high levels of ethnic retention tend to score significantly lower 
on host country culture adoption. This relationship holds when we control for a 
range of individual background variables. A negative relation between measures 
of adoption and retention has also been found in other studies (Berry et al. 2006; 
Birman, Trickett, and Vinokurov 2002; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). Of course, this 
is not to deny that some individuals succeed in combining strong orientations on 
both cultures (see also, Verkuyten 2006), but our results indicate that this is not 
the predominant tendency among Turkish immigrants. However, among Dutch 
Turks and among the second generation ethnic retention and host culture 
adoption were not significantly related in the domains of identification and 
language. 
It should be emphasized that although we found significant cross-national 
differences for all but two (Turkish identification and Turkish language 
proficiency) of the indicators of retention and adoption, these country differences 
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are usually modest in size. Several other variables were important. Not 
surprisingly, we found stronger host culture adoption and somewhat less ethnic 
retention among the 1.5th and 2nd generations. Confirming the importance of 
variation within the country and culture of origin, respondents originating in East-
Central Anatolia, which is more ethnically diverse and less religiously 
conservative, displayed less ethnic retention and more host culture adoption. The 
same was true for those belonging to the liberal Alevi branch of Islam. We also 
found strong and consistent negative relationships between socio-economic 
integration and cultural retention, and positive relationships with host culture 
adoption.  
The generalizabilty of our findings is of course affected by the limitation to 
immigrants from Turkey. For instance, it is possible that the high social cohesion 
among Turks (e.g. Fennema and Tillie 1999) results in a stronger ethnic 
orientation than for groups with less strong community structures. However, the 
restricted nature of the sample is also the major strength of this study, since it 
minimizes cross-national composition effects, which previous comparative 
studies have not been able to control for sufficiently. We realise that with three 
immigration countries, we have not been able to model cross-national differences 
in a multivariate way. We believe, however, that controlled comparative designs 
such as ours can fill an important gap between single-country case studies on the 
one hand, and broad, large-N studies, on the other. Future work along these lines 
should extend the perspective to other immigrant groups and additional 
immigration countries. 
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